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This paper examines growth rates of real GDP per capita during decolonization in 
sub-Saharan Africa. For each period considered, I divide the sample between those countries 
that gained independence during the period and those that either remained colonies or were 
already independent. These newly independent countries grew slower than the control group. 
However, a more refined categorization shows that decolonizers grew slower than those that 
received their independence previously but did not grow slower than those that remained 
colonies. Thus, whether or not one perceives a cost of decolonization depends on what one 
uses as the control group. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Following World War Two, Africa experienced a rapid transformation as former 
colonies gained their independence. What effect did these sudden changes have upon 
growth rates of income per capita? Given the focus placed on the economic development 
of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) since 1960, this is an important question and perhaps can 
explain differences in growth paths. Except for Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa, the 
remaining countries did not become independent until after 1950. Moreover, these 
countries did not receive independence at the same time. After World War Two, Sudan 
led SSA in gaining independence in 1956 whereas Namibia did not become independent 
until 1991. Do differences in the timing of independence help explain different growth 
trajectories across these countries? Many economic growth regressions stemming from 
Barro (1991) begin their sample in 1960. Given that some countries achieved 
independence in or after 1960, mixing colonies, recent decolonizers, and previously 
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independent countries might not be a harmless simplification.
1
This paper examines this issue using two empirical specifications. The first 
compares growth rates of countries becoming independent in some period to those that 
did not undergo this political transformation during this same period. The second 
specification includes three groups: those that remained colonies during the period, those 
that became independent, and those that were already independent. The first 
specification attempts to determine whether countries that underwent decolonization (a 
specific type of political change) experienced different rates of growth than observations 
that did not change status. That is, they either remained colonies or were already 
independent. More generally, this methodology examines how this specific type of 
political transition influences short-run growth outcomes. The second specification uses 
a more refined classification to make comparisons across three groups. For example, by 
comparing growth in newly independent countries with growth rates from those 
remaining colonies, one can see if decolonization lowered growth relative to the 
alternative of remaining a colony. This second specification can also compare growth 
rates of colonies to those of nascent countries. Finally, there might also be a difference 
in growth rates for those just becoming independent to those who had previously 
become independent. In all of these comparisons, the aim is to examine growth rates 
across countries differing in their political status at that time. 
Bertocchi and Canova (1996) examine economic growth in African countries before 
and after decolonization. They examine whether country x grew faster after gaining 
independence than during the preceding years and find that economic growth increased 
after independence.
2 An advantage of this methodology is that country specific factors 
are held constant. A disadvantage is that temporal factors (not related to decolonization) 
might influence the results. This might be important as growth rates in SSA in the 
1970’s (roughly 1%) averaged less than growth rates during the 1960’s (1.7%). For 
countries that obtained their independence circa 1970, a continent or global economic 
slowdown could then distort the findings. Another disadvantage of their procedure is 
that countries obtaining independence in 1960 cannot be included in the sample as 
economic growth data is unavailable before 1960. 
Unlike their methodology, the procedure considered here holds the temporal 
dimension constant although country specific factors still might inject noise into the 
study. A related example is found in Minier (1998) who examines whether countries that 
democratized experienced different growth rates than otherwise similar countries that 
did not undergo similar political transformations. 
 
1 In this paper, the term “decolonization” is equivalent to “transfer of power” and “independence”. Although 
decolonization might also hold economic, psychological, or cultural implications, the term here merely 
denotes a political transfer of power from the colonial power to the indigenous peoples. 
2 Alam (1994) uses a sample of 22 countries, only twelve of which are from sub-Saharan Africa, and does not 
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In examining the economic costs or benefits of decolonization, I only consider 
countries in SSA. Given the dismal growth performance of many of these countries, 
understanding economic growth (or the lack thereof) in this region becomes highly 
important in finding ways to help these countries foment economic growth. (See Ghura 
(1995), Savvides (1995), Bloom and Sachs (1998) for more general treatments 
examining economic growth in SSA.) A second reason to concentrate on this region is to 
limit the diversity of countries in the sample while still retaining an adequate number of 
observations. 
Summarizing the findings of the paper, countries becoming independent grew slower 
than did countries not simultaneously undergoing this type of political change. However, 
there is no strong evidence of a cost to decolonization relative to remaining a colony. 
Decolonizing countries are not found to grow slower than ones that remained colonies 
during the same period. In this sense, there is not found to be a cost of decolonizing 
because growth does not decrease relative to that from the alternative of remaining a 
colony. Some might consider this surprising given that political transformations are 
often seen as costly, at least in the short run. Instead, both decolonizing countries and 
remaining colonies grew slower than previously independent countries. 
This paper does not attempt to explore long-run costs or benefits to becoming 
independent. Both Davidson (1992) and Englebert (2000) discuss how the colonial 
structure created by Europeans negatively affected Africa’s development and why 
Africa is the poorest region in the world today. Given the political conditions arising 
from colonialism, leaders could not enact policies more beneficial to development. 
Lofchie (1971) also presents several cases in which political constraints limited the 
potential for economic development in SSA. Nevertheless, this paper only focuses on 
short-run effects of decolonization and how this type of political change might influence 
economic growth. Although longer-run perspectives are left for other work, I still 
consider the focus of this paper important since transitional costs need not be small, 
either upon growth or welfare. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief outline of 
decolonization in SSA and discusses previous literature. Section 3 presents a theoretical 
construct that provides insight into the empirical model. Section 4 presents the empirical 
model and the data. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.    HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Table 1 lists the countries in the sample and gives information regarding date of 
independence and what European country was the colonial power preceding 
independence. How did such instances of decolonization affect growth outcomes? 
Several claim that these political changes held negative effects. Chai (1998) argues that 
leaders in newly independent African nations often enacted socialist policies in order to 
move away from the capitalist policies more identified with the former colonial powers.   KEVIN SYLWESTER    90
Table 1.  Country  Histories 
Country  Colony Of  Year of Independence t such that Dt = 1 
Angola Portugal  1975 4 
Benin France  1960  1 
Botswana Britain  1966  2 
Burkina Faso  France  1960  1 
Burundi Belgium  1962  1 
Cameroon France  1960  1 
Cape Verde  Portugal  1975  4 
Central African Rep.  France  1960  1 
Chad France  1960  1 
Comoros France  1975  4 
Congo France  1960 1 
Dem. Congo (Zaire)  Belgium  1960  1 
Ethiopia Independent  NA  Dt = 0 for all t 
Gabon France  1960 1 
Gambia Britain  1965  2 
Ghana Britain    1957 Dt = 0 for all t   
Guinea France  1958 1 
Guinea-Bissau Portugal  1974  4 
Kenya Britain  1963 2 
Lesotho Britain  1966  2 
Liberia Independent  1847 Dt = 0 for all t   
Madagascar France  1960  1 
Malawi Britain  1964  2 
Mali France  1960  1 
Mauritania France  1960  1 
Mauritius Britain  1968  3 
Mozambique Portugal  1975  4 
Niger France  1960  1 
Nigeria Britain  1960 1 
Rwanda Belgium  1962  1 
Senegal France  1960  1 
Sierra Leone  Britain  1961  1 
Somalia Italy  1960  1 
South Africa  Britain  1910  Dt = 0 for all t 
Sudan Britain  1956  Dt = 0 for all t 
Swaziland Britain  1968  3 
Tanzania Britain  1964  2 
Togo France  1960  1 
Uganda Britain  1962  1 
Zambia Britain  1964  2 
Zimbabwe Britain  1980  5 
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Not only might such policies be less conducive to growth but a rapid and substantial 
change in government policy might have increased the costs of these political 
transformations. Etemad (2000) states that decolonization led to emigration of 
colony-born Europeans thereby reducing the amount of human capital in the newly 
independent nation. Of the four major colonial powers, Britain to a greater degree took 
steps before 1960 to prepare colonies for independence (see Low (1988)). The more 
sudden transfers of power in other colonies could have left them less prepared to 
establish governments that could promote economic development as political issues 
were less resolved. Young (1986) provides for a more detailed description of the 
economic and political problems newly independent countries in Africa faced, including 
internal disruption and civil war. 
Others do not necessarily see decolonization as being costly or greatly affecting 
growth outcomes. If colonialism involves costs upon the host regions as argued in Alam 
(1994), then decolonizing might thereby remove some of these impediments to 
economic growth. Coquery-Vidrovitch (1988) argues that many of the technocrats in 
French Africa remained European and that metropolitan influences and institutions still 
remained, thereby lessening differences before and after independence. To the extent 
that colonial bureaucracies contained Africans, then changes stemming from transfers of 
power should be muted. Finally, dependency theorists state that the era of colonialism 
was merely replaced by one of ‘neocolonialism’ in which the newly independent 
countries were still connected to their colonizing powers and so were still constrained by 
forces similar to the ones in place during colonialism (see Zartman (1976)). Under such 
a view, economic outcomes would not be predicted to drastically change. Given these 
differing hypotheses, it is not clear whether decolonization should decrease economic 




3.  THEORETICAL  CONSTRUCT 
 
In examining growth in SSA, Sachs and Warner (1997) base their empirical 
specification on the equation:   where   is the log of 
current per capita income,   is the log of steady state per capita income,   is the 
log of initial per capita income, and   is a parameter affecting the speed of 
convergence to steady state. Convergence occurs provided   Convergence to   
is interpreted not to mean that growth stops but that the growth rate reaches a constant 
trend. Along the transition path to  , growth rates are increasing with the gap between 
initial and steady state income: 
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). 0 ( y y −  A similar strategy is employed here but with 
two changes. 
The first is to allow for the possibility that colonies and independent countries have 
different long-run steady states. Let   be given by   where   denotes a  y ) , ( p X y XKEVIN SYLWESTER    92
vector of exogenous parameters that determines long-run income levels and   denotes 
the political status of the entity: 
p
c p =  for a colony and  i p =  for an independent 
country. If   then colonies and independent countries are converging to different 
income levels, ceteris paribus. Given    countries with higher  ’s will have faster 
growth rates since they are further away from their steady states. 
, i c ≠
), 0 ( y y
The second modification accounts for the effects that political changes can have on 
current income. Suppose growth along the transition path also depends on political 
changes. Namely,   where   equals one if the 
colony becomes independent during period t and equals zero otherwise. The shock 
) ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) ( t h z y e y e t y
jt jt + + − =
− − ) (t h
z  
denotes the effect that the political transition has on current income. If   the 
political change exerts a short-run cost in that it lowers current income from what it 
would have been. If    the move to independence has a positive effect in the short 
run. Even if 
, 0 < z
, 0 > z
), , ( ) , ( i y c y ⋅ < ⋅   growth might still decline at independence provided  z  is 
sufficiently large in magnitude. 
Two empirical specifications are presented below. The first assumes   so that 
steady states do not rely on the political status of the observation. If growth rates differ, 
then it must be because    The second specification relaxes this assumption and so 
allows steady states to differ between the two groups. 
i c =
. 0 ≠ z
 
 
4.  THE  METHODOLOGY 
 
Unless otherwise stated, data is taken from Barro and Lee (1994). Output level and 
growth measures come from version 5.5 of the Summers and Heston data in the Barro 
and Lee (1994) data set. 
Consider the following empirical specification: 
 
, , , , , t n t n t n t n t t n v D b Y B x a GROWTH + + + + =                               ( 1 )  
 
where    denotes the country and  n 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = t   denotes the period with 1 = 1960-65, 
2 = 1965-70, 3 = 1970-75, 4 = 1975-80, and 5 = 1980-85. 
GROWTH denotes the average growth rate of real GDP per capita (adjusted for 
purchasing power parity) over the period. I begin in 1960 as data for many countries is 
not available before then. I end in 1985 as the majority of countries in SSA gained their 
independence before Zimbabwe did in 1980. No other country gained independence 
until Namibia in 1991. I allow average growth rates to differ over time as the intercept is 
time dependent (with    set equal to zero). Growth differences over time could exist as 
regional or global shocks alter average growth rates in SSA, but including time 
dependent intercepts make it less likely that these shocks would be driving the results. 
1 a
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country histories, geography including natural resource endowments, and ethnic 
composition (provided that ethnicity remains stable over time). Such fixed effects are 
likely to be important in determining steady state outcomes. Of note is that colonial 
heritage does not change after independence and so this fixed effect implicitly controls 
for who was the colonizing power just before independence as differences in colonial 
policy or institutions (for example, legal codes) might hold implications for long-run 
income levels. 
Matrix    contains variables that differ over time. It includes the natural log of real 
GDP per capita (GDP) and gross enrollment in primary education (PRIM), both taken 
from the initial year of the period. The gross enrollment rate in primary education 
(denoted as Pxx in Barro-Lee (1994) and originally taken from UNESCO) is used as a 
proxy for human capital since other measures of human capital such as the average 
education level among the adult population or enrollment in secondary education are 
less available for African countries. Both GDP and PRIM are included to better coincide 
with standard empirical specifications in the economic growth literature. Moreover, 
Grier (1999) argues that controlling for human capital is important in explaining growth 
differences between former French and British colonies. Linking (1) with the model in 
Section 3, GDP is included since growth is increasing in the gap, 
Y
). 0 ( y y −  PRIM is 
included as human capital is likely to determine steady state income as argued in 
Mankiw  et al. (1991). To keep the specification as general as possible, I allow the 
coefficients on the human capital and initial income variables to vary over time although 
this is not crucial for the findings of the paper. 
The dummy variable    equals one if the year that country n gained 
independence is closest to the initial year in period s (where 
s n D ,
5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = s ) versus other 
years divisible by five and equals zero otherwise. As examples:   if   
decolonized in 1960,   if n decolonized in 1966,   if n decolonized in 
1964, and   for   if n decolonized in 1957 or before. Only six of 
the forty countries in the sample gained independence more than a year away from a 
year divisible by five (e.g., 1963) and so these five year increments are generally 
appropriate as windows for examining growth rates following decolonization (see Table 
1 for groupings). Of interest is the value of the coefficient b. If it is negative, 
decolonizing countries grew slower than ones that did not decolonize during the same 
period. 
1 1 , = n D n
1 2 , = n D 1 2 , = n D
0 , = s n D 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = s
I use five year periods so as to consider short-run effects while still allowing time for 
such effects to be felt. Political transitions are not immediate as it takes time for 
elections to be held and ministerial offices filled. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding 
these political changes might not be resolved within one or two years and such 
uncertainty regarding policies and political stability could have deleterious effects on 
growth for several years hence. Thus, if nominal or, more importantly, de facto 
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in length to capture the effects of these transitions on growth. In addition, if I use periods 
shorter in duration than what spans the actual transition then it becomes less likely that I 
can ascertain the effects of the transition on growth as part of the effect will be 
erroneously placed in non-transitional periods.
3 Averaging over five years also makes it 
less likely that one or two year aberrations will be driving the results. I refrain from 
using periods longer than five years since the issue here is examining short-run costs of 
decolonization and whether such types of political transformations exert negative effects 
on contemporaneous growth rates. 
The unobservable component   is assumed to have mean zero and finite variance. 
Since v might be correlated over time, I estimate the five equations implicit in (1) using 
a SUR specification but with not necessarily the same number of observations for each 
period (due to missing data). 
v
The specification in (1) compares decolonizing countries to those that did not 
undergo such a political transformation during the period. As such, it can help determine 
if such political transitions are associated with lower economic growth. However, the 
specification in (1) does not distinguish the control group   between those 
remaining colonies during   and those already independent before  . This is not a 
problem if   since independent countries are not predicted to have higher long-run 
income than do colonies. 
) 0 ( = t D
t t
c i =
But another specification is needed if  . i c ≠   Consider the following: 
 
, , , , , , t n t n t n t n t n t t n v I d D b Y B x a GROWTH + + + + + =                          ( 2 )  
 
where   if   for some s preceding   ) 1 , = t n I 1 , = s n D t ( t s <  or if n was independent 
before 1958. Otherwise,   There are now three types of observations: ones that 
received their independence before the period in question 
. 0 , = t n I
), 0 , 1 ( = = D I  ones that 
decolonized during the period  ), 0 , 1 ( = = D I  and ones that remained colonies during 
the period   [Note: the manner in which  ). 0 , 1 ( = = D I I  is constructed, relying on the 
political status of the country in the preceding period, precludes the possibility that  I  
and  D   both equal one for the same country in the same period.] 
From (2),   implies that decolonization is associated with current growth. 
 implies that previously independent countries grew at a different rate than did 





3 Of course, using a longer window than the actual transition poses an opposite problem as part of the 
window that I consider will be of “normal” conditions. However, I believe that this problem is of less concern 
because at least I will still be capturing all of the transition in a single period. Since the focus is on examining 
the transition, I prefer that the transitional period not run across my sample periods but is contained in one 
period even if the transition does not fully span a single sample period. I believe that a five year window 
provides an adequate length of time for a transition to be contained in a single period. DECOLONIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  95
different rate than did newly independent countries. 
As with any empirical model, shortcomings arise. The first concerns what inference 
should be drawn should d differ from zero. For example, do independent countries have 
higher long-run growth rates or would d differ from zero only because countries are 
approaching a new steady state income level, i.e., independence has long-run level 
effects but not long-run growth effects as assumed in the model of Section 3? This is 
certainly an interesting question although it is not the focus of this paper. Moreover, 
using a window of 1960 to 1985 probably provides insufficient time to examine long-run 
questions, especially for countries achieving independence in the second half of the 
period. 
A second shortcoming is that the specification does not contain policy variables or 
controls that might be more contemporaneous with the different periods and can vary 
over time aside from GDP and PRIM. For example, estimations of the Solow model 
often contain population growth rates and savings rates among other variables. 
Equations (1) and (2) do not contain more contemporary variables since they are likely 
to be endogenous. Not only would this affect the results in the usual manner when right 
hand side variables are endogenous but they make it more difficult to interpret the 
findings. If colonies and newly independent countries launch different policies or have 
different characteristics, then this is an effect from decolonization but this would not be 
accounted for in  D  or I   if these policies and outcomes are being directly included in 
the empirical specification. GDP and PRIM are included since income levels and human 
capital at the beginning of the period should not depend on growth rates during the 
period. I later include current population growth rates and current investment to GDP 
ratios to check the robustness of earlier findings. 
Perhaps the most important concern is the potential for the date of decolonization to 
be endogenous. If economic growth influences whether or not a colony becomes 
independent, then the coefficient estimates should not be interpreted as effects from 
decolonization and an alternative method of estimation is required. However, given how 
decolonization occurred, I do not believe that this is a problem as independence drives 
had greater political than economic motivations in the colonies. Although colonizing 
powers considered the economic costs of retaining colonies, these concerns seemed to be 
more related to longer-run costs and not due to the short-run fluctuations considered 
here.  
Three of the countries were independent long before World War Two. France’s 
decision to acquiesce to national movements stemmed from de Gaulle’s decision to alter 
colonial policy given what was happening in Algeria (see Kaba (1988)). Stengers (1982) 
reports that Zaire’s (now Democratic Congo) independence came after a sudden burst of 
colonial riots in 1959 convinced the Belgian public that a colonial struggle like what was 
occurring in Algeria or in Southeast Asia would be costly and not winnable in the long run. 
Given the lack of support, the Belgian government quickly granted independence and 
Zaire (now Dem. Congo) was created. With the Congo gone, there was little reason to 
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usurpation of power in Portugal and although this coup was brought about by frustration 
with its armed struggle with its colonies, I find it more likely that these frustrations were 
related to the direct costs on Portugal rather than with the economic growth rates of its 
colonies. Although Mozambique, Angola, and Cape Verde all had negative growth rates in 
the period before independence, Guinea-Bissau grew at a 2% rate between 1970 and 1975 
but still received independence with the others. Moreover, the previous government had 
been willing to bear the costs of negative growth in the other three colonies. 
British colonies underwent the most diverse experiences. Great Britain left the Sudan 
once the Egyptian threat subsided (see Daly (1988)). Independence in their West African 
colonies happened contemporaneously with that of the French colonies. In fact, Ghana’s 
independence helped spark drives to independence in French colonies. Britain soon left 
its remaining colonies in West Africa as it had previously planned. The situation differed 
in East Africa as the presence of while settlers complicated the picture. Independence for 
Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganika occurred when the British government found acceptable 
individuals such as Kenyatta to whom to transfer power. Zambia and Malawi received 
independence when they rejected British attempts to form a federation between these 
two and Southern Rhodesia due to the larger presence of white settlers in the latter (see 
Gifford (1982)). Zimbabwe underwent a colonial struggle which turned against the 
white settlers after the Portuguese colonies achieved independence thereby denying the 
white minority regional support. Independence followed in 1980. Low (1988) provides a 
more detailed summary of independence movements in former British colonies. 




5.  RESULTS 
 
The first column of Table 2 presents results from (1). To conserve space, I do not 
report the coefficients on the country specific fixed effects. Moreover, I only report the 
coefficients and not the standard errors for the coefficients on initial income and human 
capital. Full results are available from the author on request. 
The coefficients on GDPt coincide with previous findings in the empirical growth 
literature. The coefficients on PRIMt are negative, suggesting that those countries having 
greater enrollment in primary education grew slower although coefficients for the later 
periods lose statistical significance. The lack of a large positive association between 
human capital and growth as often reported in the literature might be due to limiting the 
sample to SSA which diminishes variation across observations. Savvides (1995) also 
does not find a positive relation between education enrollment (although he uses 
secondary education) and economic growth in SSA when using panel data. Moreover, 
other studies have also failed to find large positive associations between measures of 
human capital and growth. Romer (1989) reports no significant association between 
literacy rates and economic growth.   DECOLONIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  97
Table 2.    SUR Coefficients and Stan Errors (Dep. Var. is GROWTH) 

































** -0.0289 -0.0369 
PRIM3 -0.0429 -0.0687
*** -0.0271 -0.0434 
PRIM4 -0.0203 -0.0458
* -0.0146 -0.0301 














































































INV1    0.0075  0.0029 
INV2    0.0402  0.0465 
INV3    0.1162  0.1072 
INV4    0.1606
** 0.1378
*
INV5    0.2240
*** 0.1864
**
POPG1    0.0065  0.0324 
POPG2    0.0386  0.0315 
POPG3    -0.0446  -0.1016 
POPG4    -0.5272
*** -0.5130
***




1 NA 0.0000 NA 0.0016 
Countries  41 41 41 41 
Total  obs. 190 190 190 190 
Notes: Results for country level fixed effects not presented in order to save space but available from the 
author on request.   
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
1P-value from Wald test of Null hypothesis that b = d in Equation (2). 
* denotes significance at 10% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. KEVIN SYLWESTER    98
De Gregorio (1992) finds that in Latin America, school enrollment indices were not 
positively correlated with growth. Therefore, the findings of this paper regarding school 
enrollment and economic growth are not unique. 
The coefficient on D is -0.018 and is significant at the 1% level. Its magnitude 
suggests that during the period of decolonization, a country’s growth rate was 1.8 
percentage points lower than otherwise similar countries but who decolonized before or 
after this period. These findings indicate that there could certainly be a sizable economic 
cost during this political transformation. Uncertainty as to the policies of a new 
government or as to the political stability of nascent institutions could both create 
disincentives for productive activities and reduce growth rates. The negative coefficient 
also provides evidence against Coquery-Vidrovitch (1988) who downplayed any 
negative effects of decolonization, arguing that African bureaucracies remained quite 
similar before and after independence, at least for some colonies. Given that I explicitly 
control for human capital and that I am considering short-run effects, it is also unlikely 
that the negative coefficient on D is capturing a negative effect from a loss of human 
capital as hypothesized by Etemad (2000). Instead, there is evidence that the change in 
political institutions itself exerted a negative effect on growth. 
The specification in column two includes the independence dummies found in (2). 
The control group of countries are those that remained colonies during the period 
 Findings regarding initial GDP and human capital are similar to those 
presented above. However, the sign of the coefficient on b becomes positive although 
not significant. There is now no evidence of any cost of decolonization on economic 
growth when one compares these countries to those that remained colonies,   and 
the contentions of Coquery-Vidrovitch (1988) are now supported under this more 
refined classification. On the other hand, the coefficient on   is 0.047, significant at 
the 1% level. There is strong evidence that previously independent countries grew faster 
than colonies, a finding in line with that from Bertocchi and Canova (1996) although our 
methodologies greatly differ. This result also supports the notion that growth rates in 
colonies were sacrificed so as to serve the needs of the mother country. Once colonies 
became independent, they not only had greater control over economic policy but could 
shape policy to promote their own interests without worrying about how such policies 
affected countries in Europe (i.e., the mother countries). In accordance with the model in 
Section 3, such policy differences imply that    and so these countries grew faster as 
they were approaching a higher steady state. This finding that independent countries 
grew faster than colonies also rebuts Zartman (1976) who argued that former colonies 
were not truly independent as they still relied on their former colonizers and remained 
subservient. Although these findings do not imply that no such connections existed after 
independence, such ties (if they existed) were not strong enough to completely dissipate 
the growth advantages that independent countries have over colonies. Moreover, a Wald 
test of the null   has a p-value less than 0.01 (significant at 1% level) providing 
evidence that countries that decolonized grew slower than those that had already gained 
). 0 , 0 ( = = D I
, 0 = z
t n I ,
c i >
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independence. Although   implies that independent countries, including newly 
independent ones, should grow faster than colonies, a possibility is that growth does not 
immediately increase after independence. The transition does not lower growth since 
 implies   but the drive to the higher steady state is delayed. In this sense, 
uncertainty about policies and political stability do not lower growth relative to growth 
under the previous regime but merely delay the onset of higher growth. 
i c <
0 = b , 0 = z
Columns 3 and 4 add two other controls, the population growth rate of the period 
(POPG) and the investment to GDP ratio (INV) during the period to account for the 
savings rate. Savings rates and population growth rates are steady state parameters in 
standard Solow growth models. However, a disadvantage with including these controls 
is that they are likely to be endogenous, especially investment. 
In the first periods considered, there is not a strong relation between investment and 
growth although the association becomes stronger in periods four and five. Similarly, 
there is no strong relation between population growth and economic growth until these 
same two periods where there is evidence of a negative association. One possible 
explanation for these results is that the political upheavals that mostly occurred during 
the 1960’s and early 1970’s were no longer as frequent afterwards and so did not 
dominate other factors in how they influenced economic growth. Consequently, other 
factors such as investment rates played larger roles. 
The coefficients on GDP and PRIM remain the same with two exceptions. One, the 
coefficient on GDP1 becomes positive, implying that growth was positively related to 
income in the early 1960’s. Second, there is now less evidence of a negative association 
between primary schooling and economic growth although the association remains 
negative for the early 1960’s. Both coefficients have signs similar to those found in 
Mankiw et al. (1991). The results regarding d change slightly. In column 4, d remains 
significant but only at the 10% level and its magnitude is cut in half (0.0236), suggesting 
that differences in investment levels can explain some but not all of the differences in 
growth between independent countries and colonies. This implies that uncertainty as to 
policy and political conditions might not just affect the level of investment but how 
productive investment becomes. Perhaps greater uncertainty makes it unclear as to 




4 Results regarding the coefficients b and d were generally robust when letting Bt = B in (1) and (2) so that 
the coefficients on initial GDP per capita, primary enrollment, investment, and population growth were set 
equal over the five periods. The lone exception occurred in the analog to column (3) where b is negative but 
just misses significance at the 10% level. The coefficient on primary education is always negative and 
sometimes significant. The coefficient in investment is significantly positive whereas the coefficient on 
population growth is significantly negative in the two specifications where they appeared. The coefficient on 
initial GDP is negative and significant without INV or GPOP but becomes positive once including these other 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
 
These results do not speak to Africa’s long-run development problems where 
political factors could explain many of the disappointing outcomes. Instead, they 
describe what occurred at decolonization and so can help us better understand general 
effects from this type of political transformation. This paper finds that there was no 
decrease in growth relative to the alternative of remaining a colony. The reason why 
decolonizers exhibited lower growth than did those not concurrently undergoing a 
political change is that decolonizers grew slower than did nascent countries. These 
results provide evidence against the claim that this type of political transition caused 
lower growth than experienced previously. There is no evidence of transitional costs. 
The paper also finds that previously independent countries grew faster than did the 
existing colonies. Whether or not a region is independent or controlled by an external 
power appear important for growth outcomes. This finding holds implications for the 
empirical growth literature as controlling for political status (colony or country) appears 
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